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REVOLUTIONARY DEFENCISM AS A CUL-DE-SAC?
Socialist Parties and the Question of War and Peace 
in the Russian Revolution of 1917/18
Lutz Häfner
University of Göttingen
With the benefit of hindsight, the Menshevik leader fedor Dan conceded in
his West european exile, that “the immediate termination of war, even at the
price of serious sacrifices” would have been imperative after the february revo -
lution of 1917.1 This statement of one of the most important social-democratic
revolutionaries serves as my starting point. Like rex A. Wade in his seminal
study2 or fedor A. Seleznev quite recently,3 I will argue that the question of war
and peace was the pivot of all politics in 1917: The major issues of political dis-
sent–such as the agrarian question, the social question, the provisioning of russia
or the elections to and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly–were related
to this topic. Moreover, it was the main bone of contention when the radical fac-
tions of the Social-Democratic Internationalists and the Left Socialist revolu-
tionaries (Internationalists) split off their old parties in autumn of 1917.
The issue of war and peace got a new political quality after October 1917
when the Soviet Government accepted to conclude not only a separate but even
an undemocratic peace dictate. Was the “shameful” peace treaty, which
amounted to the decomposition of the former empire, politically necessary
because it presented the single option if the Bolshevik government was to sur-
vive?4 Did the peace treaty become a caesura in russian domestic politics which
1. Th. Dan, « Die Sozialdemokratie rußlands nach dem Jahre 1908 », Julius Martow, Geschichte der
russischen Sozialdemokratie. Mit einem Nachtrag von Th. Dan, Berlin, Dietz, 1926, rpt. erlangen, Politladen
erlangen, 1973, p. 225-320, here p. 303.
2. rex A. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February-October 1917, Stanford CA, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1969, p. VI ; Idem, « The Great War, revolution and the Struggle Over Peace : russia, 1917 »,
Revolutionary Russia 30, 2017, 2, p. 182-195, here p. 183.
3. fedor A. Seleznev, Революция 1917 года и борьба элит вокруг вопроса о сепаратном мире с
Германией. 1914-1918 гг., Sankt-Peterburg, Aletejja, 2017, p. 11.
4. Wade, « The russian revolution and Civil War », The Cambridge History of Communism, vol. 1 :
World Revolution and Socialism in One Country 1917-1941, Silvio Pons, Stephen A. Smith (eds.), Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 74-95, here p. 84.
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further deepened the rift between the different Socialist parties? for the parties
represented in the All-russian Central executive Committee of the Soviets the
peace question became the last chance to stop the fratricidal war and to reunite
the warring socialist camps.5 This was, however, at the cost of offering military
resistance against the Quadruple Alliance. Did the peace further contribute to
diminish the popularity of the Bolshevik party especially among its proletarian
followers as richard Sakwa, Tony Brenton and other historians suggest or did
Lenin sacrifice the russian revolution in order to save Bolshevik arbitrary power
as the Anarchist Vsevolod Volin argued?6 Did Soviet russia get the “breathing
spell” that Lenin and his comrades regarded as conditio sine qua non to save the
revolution and to enhance the construction of socialist state and society? 
To answer these questions, I will start with some brief remarks about the
differentiations within the socialist camp right from the beginning of WWI
until the february revolution. Continuing with the program of immediate ge-
neral peace without annexations and indemnities of the Petrograd Soviet the
paper analyses the positions of the main socialist parties concerning war and
peace. The four options were: 1) defencism, 2) revolutionary war, 3) not war
but upris ing, and 4) separate peace and breathing spell. The penultimate section
discusses the attitudes of the Soviets of workers, soldiers and peasants and
their reactions to the peace issue in february and March of 1918. finally,
results are summarised and evaluated.
“THe WAr AS fATHer Of ALL THInGS”
The outbreak of WWI signified not only the failure of the Second Socialist
International. It clarified also to which extent nationalism as an ideology of inte-
gration alienated the constituency of socialism and its parties. The “political
religion” of nationalism was more encompassing and flexible than socialism
that was never attractive to certain layers of the society. After the outbreak of
the war every party belonging to the Second Socialist International had to raise
the crucial question “What is your take on war” (and–of course–on revolution)?7
5. The demand to build a united socialist Government was popular among Menshevik-Internationalists.
even the Left Srs thought of an agreement on defence with the moderate socialists after the resumption of
hostilities on february 18. Lenin, however, opposed any cooperation with of other socialist factions, see
Alexander rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power : The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd, Bloomington,
In, Bloomington University Press, 2007, p. 162 ; Aleksandr V. Šubin, Старт Страны Советов. Революция.
Октябрь 1917-март 1918, Sankt-Peterburg, Piter, 2017, p. 425.
6. Tony Brenton, « Introduction », Was revolution inevitable? Turning Points of the Russian Revolution,
Tony Brenton (ed.), London, Profile Books, 2016, p. 1-10, here p. 7 ; richard Sakwa, « 1917-22. The rise of
Leninism: The death of political pluralism in the post-revolutionary Bolshevik party », Ibid., p. 262-283, here
p. 271; Vsevolod M. Volin, « К вопросу о причинах “поражения анархизма” в русской революции »,
Анархический вестник, 1923, 5-6, p. 8-12, here p. 11.
7. Lutz Häfner, « Zwischen ‚Vaterlandsverteidigung‘ und ‚Defätismus’: die Partei der Sozialrevolutio-
näre und die ‚dritte Kraft‘ als Weg aus dem Krieg », Krieg und Frieden im Spiegel des Sozialismus 1914-
1918, frank Jacob, riccardo Altieri (eds.), Berlin, Metropol, 2018, p. 367-387, here p. 367.
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Bitter internal conflicts arose about this question in every party. Two opposing
socialist camps became apparent.
The right wing of the entente socialists took a nationalist stand. They
referred to the behaviour of the German Social-democratic party which gave
their parliamentary consent to the war loans and thus concluded the so called
“fortress truce” [Burgfrieden]. In russia leading defencists such as the “father
or russian Marxism”, the social democrat Georgii V. Plekhanov, or the Socialist
revolutionary [Sr] Il′ia I. Bunakov-fondaminskii were convinced that it was
time to renounce previous and now atavistic psychological patterns of behaviour
and to have confidence in the Tsarist Government.8 They referred to Prussian
militarism as the most dreadful threat to democracy and freedom which made
a close alliance with the autocracy imperative.9
The left wing of the socialists took an internationalist stand. Some of them
regarded the war as evil. They agreed, that russia’s victory in the war would
consolidate Tsarism. Therefore, they wanted to exploit the war as a revolution-
ary base to overthrow the old regime. They intended to make a virtue from
necessity and to transform the international military crisis into a domestic rev-
olutionary crisis.10 The Sr-Internationalist Mark A. natanson, who participated
in both international Socialist conferences in Zimmerwald and Kiental, regarded
the war as a prelude to revolution.11
Basically, the russian defencists performed a radical paradigm shift: neither
socialism, nor the internal worker’s movement, nor the interests of the toiling
masses stood at the centre of their actions but the defence of their country and
its well-being.12 Therefore, they could not even know mutual class interests of
the world proletariat. Their foes were the Germans including workers and
Socialists, whereas the russian and entente bourgeoisie were their partners.13
The position of the russian defencists reminds us of the jingoist slogan of the
former US-secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz: „My country, right or wrong“.
THe feBrUAry reVOLUTIOn AnD THe PeACe ISSUe
In the first weeks after the february revolution, it became evident that the
Soviet leadership had no unambiguous attitude towards the war. The opinions
ranged from defencism to the total withdrawal from the war. The dominant centre
8. Hoover Institution Archives, Boris I. nicolaevsky Collection, no. 232, Box 377, f. 1, l. 2.
9. Vadim V. rudnev, « Двадцать лет тому назад », Современные записки 56, 1935, p. 375-392, here
p. 377-378.
10. Viktor M. Černov, « Два течения », Война и “третья сила”. Сборник статей, Petrograd, tip. P. P.
Soikina, 1917, p. 11-16, here p. 15 ; Жизнь, no. 18 (80), 17.10.1915, p. 1.
11. Hoover Institution Archives, Boris I. nicolaevsky Collection, nr. 232, Box 377, f. 1, l. 17a.
12. Il′ja I. Bunakov, « Оборона страны и объединение демократии » Призыв, no. 1, 1.10.1915, 1,
p. 4-6, here p. 5.
13. Boris D. Kamkov, « Теоретическая эквилибристика », Отклики жизни, no. 7, 4.6.1916, p. 1-2,
here p. 2.
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of the Petrograd Soviet highlighted the principles of internationalism–whatever
this meant in detail. Some prominent socialists like Chernov or the so-called
“Siberian Internationalists” like the Mensheviks Irakli Tsereteli, fedor Dan and
Vladimir S. Voitinskii or the Sr Abram r. Gots argued after the overthrow of
Tsarism that the revolution had to be defended against the Central Powers.14
The moderate socialists made it absolutely clear that a separate peace was inad-
missible.15
To conclude a general democratic peace without annexations and indemni-
ties Mensheviks and Srs were prepared to exert pressure upon governments–be
they liberal or imperialist–through the internationalist socialist workers move-
ment. Moreover, they highlighted the idea to convene an International Socialist
Peace conference at Stockholm. The Western entente powers, however,
thwarted these plans.16 The Western governments deprived their socialists of
international passports, ruled out any compromising peace like a status quo ante
of August 1914, stuck to their war aim of an ultimate victory and discredited
themselves in the eyes of the majority of the russian public opinion. The mod-
erate socialist eyewitness, assistant Army Commissar to the Southwestern front
and writer Viktor B. Shklovskii put all the blame for russia’s political break-
down in 1917 “on the criminal, thrice cursed, infamous and merciless politics”
of russia’s allies who did not accept the Soviet’s peace formula. Thus, they
blew up russia and opened the gates for the successful internationalist anti-war
propaganda.17
Why were the russian moderate socialists pledged to continuing the war
against the Central powers after february 1917 although their popularity as well
as that of the Provisional Government had already started to melt away in the
spring of 1917? According to Laura engelstein russian socialists “feared the
wrath of the patriotic Army High Command”. Moreover, russia’s economic
and military weakness made it imperative to rely on British and french help.
This dependence put russia in a tight spot: Without the Western entente powers
russia could neither continue the war nor exit it.18 This is, however, only half
the story. Britain and france needed the second front to guarantee the military
stalemate on the Western front.19 This gave both the russian moderate Socialists
14. Hannu Immonen, Мечты о новой России. Виктор Чернов (1873-1952), Sankt-Peterburg, evropeis-
kij universitet v Sankt-Peterburge, 2015, p. 188, 190, 209 ; Boris I. Kolonickij, Товарищ Керенский: анти-
монархическая революция и формирование культа “вождя народа” (март-июнь 1917 года), Moskva,
nLO, 2017, p. 365 ; Wade, The Russian Search…, p. 18-19.
15. « Обращение Совета Р. и С. Д. К социалистам всех стран », Рабочая газета, no. 45, 2.5.1917,
p. 2.
16. See Viktor Schklowskij, Sentimentale Reise, Berlin, Die Andere Bibliothek, 2017, p. 33 and his acer-
bic outrage upon russia’s Western Allies ; Pavlov, « От Февраля…», p. 108.
17. Schklowskij, Sentimentale Reise…, p. 87.
18. Laura engelstein, Russia in Flames : War, Revolution, Civil War, 1914-1921, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2017, p. 239.
19. Brenton, « Introduction… », p. 18 ; Michael S. neiberg, « 1917: Global War », The Cambridge His-
tory of the First World War, vol. 1: Global War, Jay Winter (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2014, p. 110-132, here p. 111.
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and the Provisional Government space for political manoeuvre, though to no
avail.
After the Kerensky offensive of summer 1917 the Old Army ceased to be
an effective fighting force to reckon with.20 The discipline eroded, fraterniza-
tions, desertions, violent acts against officers as well as civilians in the hinter-
land increased.21 As the war dragged on it became obvious that the masses, espe-
cially the soldiers, were war weary and longing for peace. In the fall of 1917
russia’s soldiers were afraid of another winter campaign.22 The call for a peace
at any price–absent in the days of the february revolution–became more and
more popular and widespread.23
War-weariness, economic decline and the crescent polarization of the society
in revolutionary russia made it receptive to radical positions of the Zimmer-
waldist left. except for the tiny Union of Sr-Maximalists the Bolsheviks were
the single independent political organization in revolutionary russia committed
to exit the war at almost any cost. All other internationalist-minded socialists,
the Left Srs or the Menshevik-Internationalists, were only factions within bigger
parties committed to the war effort or at least to the defence of the revolution.
The radical socialist left, i.e. Bolsheviks and Sr-Internationalists, were prone to
sacrifice diplomatic traditions to safe russia’s revolutionary socialist future. They
even demanded that the imperialist war had to bе converted into а civil war
against the bourgeoisie.24 especially the Bolsheviks owed their increasing polit-
ical influence to their radical anti-war propaganda. There was a symbiotic rela-
tionship: it was the Bolsheviks’ willingness to make peace25 that attracted the
soldiers on the one hand. On the other hand it ensured the Bolshevik victory in
October 1917 and legitimised their seizure of power.26
20. Schklowskij, Sentimentale Reise…, p. 87.
21. Ibid., p. 48, 55, 57, 60-61, 70, 82 ; Vladimir P. Buldakov, « Солдаты, война, мир », Российская
революция 1917 года: власть, общество, культура, Jurij A. Petrov (ed.), Moskva, rOSSPÈn, 2017, t. 2,
p. 210-243, p. 212, 217-218, 231-235; Dmitri B. Pavlov, « От Февраля к Октябрю », ibid., t. 1, p. 75-125,
here p. 102.
22. Schklowskij, Sentimentale Reise…, p. 55 ; Ol′ga S. Poršneva, Крестьяне, рабочие и солдаты Рос-
сии накануне и в годы первой мировой войны, Moskva, rOSSPÈn, 2004, p. 232.
23. Schklowskij, Sentimentale Reise…, p. 26 ; rGASPI, f. 444, op. 1, d. 18, l. 3; B. V. Avilov, « Октябрь-
ская революция », Голос Социал-Демократа. Орган Центрального Комитета Росс. Социал-Демо-
крат. Раб. Партии (Интернационалистов) 5-6, 11.2.1918, p. 3-6, here p. 4 ; see Iaroslav A. Butakov,
Брестский мир : ловушка Ленина для кайзеровской Германии, Moskva, Veče, 2012, p. 259; Šubin, Старт
Страны Советов…, p. 426.
24. See William G. rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. The Constitutional Democratic Party,
1917-1921, Princeton, nJ, Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 77.
25. The following quotation underlines the importance of the peace issue to rally behind the Bolsheviks:
This popularity can be seen in the following quote of a soldier from the end of 1917 : “On peace we are Bols-
heviks, on everything else we are S.r.’s”, quoted by Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial
Army, vol. 2 : The Road to Soviet Power and Peace, Princeton, nJ, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 367.





What is to be done? After february 1917 almost all soldiers consented to
continue the war to safeguard the russian revolution.27 evan Mawdsley holds
the view that “revolutionary defencism“ was quite popular among all strata of
the russian society in the spring of 1917.28 Bolshevik agitators complained,
that their radical peace propaganda fell on deaf ears among workers in the begin-
ning of April. Workers mistook the Bolshevik slogan “Down with the war” as
a threat of the revolution.29 Patriotic propaganda aimed to convince both rank
and file soldiers and the home front of revolutionary defence. In the popular
film “The revolutionary” directed by evgenii Bauėr30 and released in the first
half of 1917 an old narodovolets convinced his son, a Bolshevik, that the only
“salvation of the revolution lies in a victorious end to the war”.31 After some
hesitation the son admitted–however without any explicit reasoning–that his
internationalist conviction was wrong: “when the destiny of russia is at stake”
it cannot be “shameful to be a defeatist”.32 finally, both father and son volun-
teered, boarded a train heading for the front, to defend “mother russia”
together.33 However, this fictional story did not wow the audience. The obvi-
ously non lasting fascination was probably due to the fact that the screen play
had little in common with the much harsher reality.
To make the best out of a political contradictory situation, moderate social-
ists pursued a twin-track strategy: On the one hand, they intended to convene
an international conference of all socialist parties in neutral Stockholm. Both
the french and British governments and the socialists of their countries did not
welcome this move. They blamed the russian moderate socialists being radical
Zimmerwaldists.34 At the same time moderate socialists as well as the Provi-
sional government exerted pressure on the Western entente powers to accept
the principle of no annexation and indemnities and to revise the entente treaties
in the same way.35 The Menshevik Central Committee was convinced that the
27. Veniamin M. Levin, « Эволюция советских организации », Наш путь, 1918, 2, p. 224-232, here
p. 226. 
28. See evan Mawdsley, The Russian Revolution and the Baltic Fleet: War and Politics, February 1917-
April 1918, London, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1978, p. 25.
29. See David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime: From the February Revo-
lution to the July Days, 1917, London, Macmillan, 1983, p. 72.
30. ok.ru/group/54299510833256/topic/67036118463848.
31. Ibid., 26 :22.
32. Ibid., 30 :33, 30 :39 and 31 :53.
33. Ibid. 
34. Меньшевики в 1917 году, t. 1 : От января до июльских событий, Moskva, rOSSPÈn, 1994, p. 142-
145 ; David Kirby, « International Socialism and the Question of Peace. The Stockholm Conference of 1917 »,
Historical Journal 25, 1982, 3, p. 709-716, here p. 710-711. Western Socialists had little in common even with
russian moderate socialists in the question of war aims, see Pavlov, « От Февраля… », p. 106-107.
35. Dan, « Die Sozialdemokratie… », p. 297.
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russian revolution would bury the war.36 It is obvious that moderate socialists
overestimated the international impact of the russian revolution.37
The loyalty to the Western allies stretched even further on the right fringes
of neo-populist camp. The right Srs spoke of a strategic common front of the
entente powers including „active defence“, i.e. russian attacks on the eastern
front.38 They even dropped the principle of „no annexations and indemnities“
in order to allow france to retake Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium to get financial
compensations for the damages inflicted by Germany.39
As long as the Central Powers did not accept the declaration of the Petrograd
Soviet of the 14 March, russia was obliged to the principle of revolutionary
defence of the fatherland.40 Tsereteli even mentioned a honorary obligation to
defend russian democracy against the inimical imperialist forces.41 War loans
were called “revolutionary“ or “freedom loans“.42 At the end of May the Men-
shevik Central organ Rabochaia gazeta declared that the russian Army was not
under the command of “Imperialists”.43
2) Revolutionary War
The Bolsheviks–including Lenin44–commented unsystematic on the topic
of a revolutionary war in 1917. Whenever the Bolsheviks were suspected of
supporting a separate peace with the Central powers they denied this
intention–even after the October uprising.45 To realize his radical peace condi-
tions Lenin advocated revolutionary war already in mid-March of 1917. even
in the event that a revolution would not happen in Germany, Lenin advocated
to wage a revolutionary war.46 In late spring 1917 Lenin wrote that he would
not even shy away to wage a war against the capitalists of england, Japan and
the USA in the case that they did not accept a just peace.47 As the revolutionary
war conflicted with their radical peace propaganda of the Bolsheviks they
largely abstained to use this extreme claim in public.48
36. Рабочая газета, no. 34, 18.4.1917, p. 2.
37. Dan, « Die Sozialdemokratie… », p. 300, 302-303.
38. Isaak Z. Štejnberg, От Февраля до Октября 1917 г., Berlin, Mailand n.d., p. 26.
39. Третий съезд Партии социалистов-революционеров, Petrograd, Izd. TsK PSr, 1917, p. 142.
40. Dan, « Die Sozialdemokratie… », p. 296 ; « Заём Свободы », Народная Нива. Гельсингфорсский
отдел Партии Социалистов-Революционеров, no. 1, 25.4.1917, p. 3.
41. Всероссийское совещание Советов рабочих и солдатских депутатов. Стенографический
отчет, Moskva, Leningrad, Giz, 1927, p. 41.
42. for an internationalist critique see Земля и Воля, no. 51, 26.5.1917, p. 2 ; ibid., no. 53, 28.5.1917,
p. 2.
43. Рабочая газета, no. 67, 28.5.1917, p. 2.
44. Lenin, Werke, Bd. 24, p. 152 ; ibid., Bd. 25, p. 14, 26-29, 76.
45. Ibid., Bd. 25, p. 21-22.
46. Ibid., Bd. 23, p. 373 ; idem, Bd. 24, p. 162.
47. Ibid., Bd. 25, p. 44.
48. robert Service, « The Bolsheviks on Political Campaign in 1917: A Case Study of the War Question »,
Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917, Jonathan frankel, G. frankel, Baruch Knei-Paz (eds.), Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 304-325.
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On December 8, 1917 Trotsky raised the following question in the All-rus-
sian Central executive Committee: If the Constituent Assembly would not
accept the peace policy of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars what will hap-
pen? In this case, Trotsky recommended, the Bolsheviks would have to resign.
Together with the Left Srs the Bolsheviks had to appeal to a “holy war against
the militarists of all countries”.49 The fact that 387 out of 400 members of the
Bolshevik faction opted for a revolutionary war at the Second Soviet Congress
of the Moscow region in mid-December 1917, underlined the popularity of this
political demand.50
When military operations restarted on february 18, however, Soviet russia
did not wage a revolutionary war. Although many Soviet officials spoke about
it with much bravado and the Left Communists even proclaimed an open “field
civil war”51 the revolutionary war remained more a less a mere stylistic device,
a figure of thought, bearing no relation to reality and to the political practice of
the socialist parties in the russian revolution.
3) “Not War but Uprising”
In mid-January 1918 the Left Srs Central organ Znamia Truda published
an article under the heading “not War but Uprising” by Sergei D. Mstislavskii,
a member of the Central Committee of the Left Srs.52 Soldiers and civilians
were equally war weary. Under these circumstances a separate peace was imper-
ative. However, with respect to the imminent revolution in Western europe a
separate peace had to rejected. Soviet russia could not wage a „holy war“. This
idea has been discredited by Kerenskii. Moreover, the old army was in total
desintegration. It was impossible to build a socialist one since the workers did
not want to fight anymore. A „breathing spell“ was nothing else than the sur-
render to “German imperialism“ and thus synonymous to the fall of man of the
russian revolution and a betrayal of internationalism.53
In order to offer some resistance against the Central powers, Left Srs as
well as SD-Internationalists forwarded the idea to organize small voluntary
detachments of partisans attacking basically in the rear, using hit and run tactics
on the basis of a strategy of pin pricks.54
49. Lev D. Trockij, Сочинения, t. 17 : Советская республика и капиталистический мир, ч. 1 : Пер-
воначальный период организации сил, Moskva – Leningrad, Giz, 1926, p. 143.
50. Jurij G. fel′štinskij, Крушение мировой революции. Брестский мир. Октябрь 1917-ноябрь 1918,
Moskva, Terra, 1992, p. 225.
51. Коммунист, no. 8, 14.3.1918, p. 2-3.
52. Знамя Труда, no. 116, 12.1.1918, p. 2-3 ; Sergej D. Mstislavskij, « Испытание властью », Наш
путь, 1918, 2, p. 187-213, here p. 189. He had already published an article under the same heading before:
Mstislavskij, « Не война, но возстание », Дело народа, no. 4, 18.3.1917, p. 1.
53. Kamkov, Две тактики, Moskva,  Революционный социализм, 1918, p. 27-29 ; Mstislavskij,
Брестские переговоры (из дневника), 2-oe izd. Sankt Peterburg [sic], Skify, 1918, p. 65.
54. Знамя Труда, no. 116, 12.1.1918, p. 2-3 ; ibid., no. 145, 1.3.1918, p. 1 ; ibid., no. 147, 3.3.1918,
p. 1 ; ibid., no. 148, 5.3.1918, p. 1. for the position of the SD-Internationalists rGASPI, f. 444, op. 1, d. 18,
l. 5ob. for the formation of partisan units see David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure
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4) Separate Peace and “Breathing Spell”
right after the february revolution, a separate peace was not only politi-
cally totally unrealistic but even “unthinkable”. Basically, all of russian social-
ists agreed that a separate peace was unacceptable.55 Against this background
one can imagine the breach of taboo committed by those radical socialists when
they took a separate peace into consideration in the case that the Western entente
powers refused to abandon their war aims. As a consequence, the Central pow-
ers could use this denial of the russia’s Western allies as a pretext to stay away
from peace negotiations.56 russia seemed to be in an impasse.
In mid-May the well-known russian writer, literary critic and Left Sr
razumnik V. Ivanov-razumnik published an article under the heading “What
russia is fighting for”. He raised the fundamental russian question once more:
“What is to be done? To stop the war, to leave it, to make a separate war with
Imperial Germany? This does not propose any revolutionary socialist party.”
The single remaining option was to put pressure on the Western entente powers
to accept the Soviet principle of “no annexations and indemnities”. If the West-
ern Allies did not accept this as a basis for peace negotiations, „revolutionary
russia would be obliged, ‘to leave the war’, even at the cost of a separate peace
with Germany.” However, Ivanov added, Germany had to refrain from annex-
ations.57 Ivanov was quite outspoken: russia’s interests, her well-being and self-
protection were more important than international contract compliance. How-
ever, even he did not demand a peace at any cost.58 In the same vein had already
argued his party colleague Vladimir e. Trutovskii at the Second Petrograd con-
ference of the Sr party on 3 April: 
So once a war breaks out, we must struggle to put an end to it. We should
throw off the yoke of the governments of england and france […]. We should
conclude a separate peace with Germany if it renounces reparations and
annexations, and the working class will be with us in that!59
of Power : From the July Days 1917 to July 1918, London, Macmillan, 1984, p. 388 ; rabinowitch, The
Bolsheviks in Power…, p. 207.
55. Союз эсеров-максималистов. 1906-1924 гг. Документы, публицистика, Valentin V. Šeloxaev
(red.), Moskva, rOSSPÈn, 2002, p. 121; for the Трудовая народно-социалистическая партия see Alla V.
Sypčenko, « Трудовая народно-социалистическая партия в 1917-1922 годах », Политические партии
в российских революциях в начале ХХ века, Grigorij n. Sevost′janov (red.), Moskva, rOSSPÈn, 2005,
p. 488-504, here p. 499. Mensheviks, Srs and Left Srs were against a separate peace in May 1917, Dan,
« Die Sozialdemokratie… », p. 295 ; Третий съезд, p. 197 ; Štejnberg, « Почему у нас новое правитель-
ство ? », Земля и воля (Уфа), no. 18, 17.5.1917, p. 2.
56. Земля и воля, no. 43, 16.5.1917, p. 3; ibid., no. 55, 31.5.1917, p. 2; Земля и воля (Уфа), no. 79,
8.9.1917, p. 3.
57. razumnik V. Ivanov-razumnik, « За что идет война. За что воюет Россия ? », Известия Гель-
сингфорсского Совета Депутатов армии, флота и рабочих, no. 52, 18.5.1917, p. 3.
58. See Christopher read, War and Revolution in Russia, 1914-1922 : The Collapse of Tsarism and the
Establishment of Soviet Power, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 74.
59. Дело народа, no. 17, 6.4.1917, p. 1.
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At the turn of the year 1917/18 the Bolshevik party was far from being
monolithic. The Left Communists opted for a revolutionary war, Lenin became
more and more convinced that a separate peace was the single path leading out
of the oncoming catastrophe. After the february revolution the Bolsheviks
gained the reputation as a „party of peace“. It is quite possible that Lenin’s deci-
sion to reactivate this position was driven by his ambition for power.60 This gave
his party a unique position in russia’s political landscape because all other par-
ties utterly disdained a separate peace.61
Trotsky’s popular “neither war nor peace” played an important intermediary
role between the advocates of a revolutionary war–the position of the majority
in the Bolshevik party–and Lenin’s newly reached commitment to a breathing
spell.62 It was an open secret that the German Supreme Command badly needed
every military unit from the German eastern front at the Western war theatre. It
was self-evident, that the Germans did not have the capacity any more to wage
a full-scale war on two fronts. In this constellation lay the chance of survival for
the russian revolution–even without signing an “obscene” separate peace
treaty.63 However, the Central Powers restarted their attack on 18 february.
SOVIeT PUBLIC OPInIOn AnD THe SePArATe TreATy
The inner-Soviet disputes of the peace treaty were hard. Lenin even threat-
ened to resign and Sverdlov annulled imperative mandates of those Party and
Soviet delegates, who opposed the treaty, in order to secure majorities both at
the VIIth Bolshevik Party and the IVth extraordinary Soviet congresses in March,
1918.64 The Left Srs were not inclined to accept the peace.65 The moral indig-
nation about the treaty’s conditions were wide spread. The Left Srs spoke of a
„socialist disgrace“,66 reproached Lenin of nationalism and called him a „traitor
of internationalism“.67 All other russian political parties did not accept the Brest-
Litovsk treaty, too. The Mensheviks and Srs repudiated the treaty as a betrayal
of the russian revolution as well as of the international proletarian movement.68
60. Lenin ruled out any cooperation with moderates socialists because this would have meant a shift to
the right of his power basis, Šubin, Старт Страны…, p. 426.
61. Häfner, Die Partei der Linken Sozialrevolutionäre in der Russischen Revolution 1917/18, Köln –
Weimar – Wien, Böhlau, 1994, p. 364.
62. Pavel V. Makarenko, « Большевики и Брeстский мир », Вопросы истории, 2010, 3, p. 3-21.
63. Šubin, Старт Страны…, p. 424. Trotskii and Lenin were ready to accept any help of American,
British and french “imperialists”, see Columbia University, Bakhmeteff Archive, Ms. Coll. Thacher, robins,
raymond [Petrograd], 10 March 1918, ll. 1-3 ; Šubin, Старт Страны…, p. 431-432.
64. Service, « The Bolshevik Party », Critical Companion to the Revolution 1914-1921, edward Acton
(ed.) et al., London –Sydney – Auckland, Arnold, 1997, p. 231-244, here p. 237.
65. Kamkov, Две тактики, p. 27.
66. Mstislavskij, « Испытание властью »…, p. 198.
67. Kamkov, « В плену у контр-революции », Наш путь, 1918, 2, p. 214-223, here p. 218.
68. GArf, f. r9591, op. 1, d. 109, l. 15; Стенографический отчет 4-го Чрезвычайного съезда Сове-
тов рабочих, солдатских, крестьянских и казачьих депутатов, Moskva, Giz, 1920, p. 59.
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The IVth extraordinary Congress of Soviets ratified the peace treaty with
an overwhelming majority of 784 votes in favour, 261 against, 115 abstentions
and 84 who did not cast a ballot.69 This result of votes could be seen as Lenin’s
triumph first over the party’s Central Committee, then over the whole party and
finally over the Soviets and its system.70 Among the delegates more than 16 per
cent supported a revolutionary war, more than 7 per cent adhered to the idea of
a partisan war. Almost 19 per cent regarded the peace as unacceptable or fateful
for world revolution.71 However, the delegates represented only 222 Soviets of
25 provinces–at best a third of all Soviets. 
69. Стенографический отчет…, p. 64.
70. Союз эсеров-максималистов…, p. 123.
71. See Andrej V. Čertiščev, Политические партии России и массовое политическое сознание дей-
ствующей русской армии в годы Первой мировой войны : июль 1914-март 1918 гг., Moskva, VBIA,
2006, p. 848.
Table 1: Hierarchical and regional Classification of Soviets and Societal Organizations Concerning the
Question of War and Peace in february-March 1918
region/Hierarchy regional Provincial City/District Township Village Plant/Mine Other Total
1 north - 3 5 1 - 1 1 11
2 northwest - 1 10 - - 6 1 18
3 Baltic region - - - - - - - -
4 White russia - - 2 - - - 1 3
5 Western - - 1 - - - - 1
6 Ukraine - 1 5 1 - - - 7
7 new russia - - 7 1 - 1 3 12
8 Central Industrial - 3 24 6 2 - 1 36
9 Central Agricultural - 3 31 4 7 - - 45
10 Urals 2 3 25 3 - 3 1 37
11 Volga region - 2 25 1 1 - 1 30
12 Southeast - 1 3 - - - 2 6
13 Caucasus - - 1 - - - - 1
14 Siberia 2 1 15 1 1 - 1 21
15 Central Asia 3 - 1 - - - - 4
16 Unknown - - - - 3 3 1 7
17 Total 7 18 155 18 14 14 13 239
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According to a questionnaire, that the Council of Peoples’ Commissars ini-
tiated, 495 Soviets participated from 25 february to 5 March, 1918. 263 local
Soviets approved the peace.72 Table 1 shows the hierarchy and regional classi-
fication of about 240 Soviets.73 The biggest number of Soviets participated in
the Black soil and Central Agricultural region, followed by the Urals, the Cen-
tral Industrial region and the Volga region. Soviets of regions on or near the
frontline were almost entirely absent. 
Table 2 shows the decisions of many local Soviets concerning the peace
question. 35.56 per cent of these Soviets accepted the peace, 55.65 per cent
voted against the peace, 2.92 per cent supported Trotsky’s formula “neither war
nor peace”, and 5.84 per cent of the votes were indifferent or pointed out that
the Constituent Assembly had to decide.74 As a rule, regional, Provincial and
City Soviets with a higher percentage of intelligenty and workers voted against
the peace.75 Anti-peace strongholds were regions far away from the theatre of
war, i.e. the industrialized Urals and the rural Volga region. Moreover, the table
indicates that not only workers’ Soviets in the industrial centres or the bigger
provincial cities but also many Soviets representing peasant delegates voted
against the Brest-Litovsk treaty and thus against Lenin’s breathing spell.76 This
was even true for grass roots soviets at the township or even village level. If
peasants were afraid that the advance of the Central powers could reach their
territory, they showed their characteristic trait of “localism” and were inclined
to defend their soil.77
72. Häfner, PLSR, p. 380.
73. The data have been collected from different sources such as GArf, f. r1235, op. 3, dd. 12-21; Стено -
графический отчет…, p. 103-133 ; Häfner, PLSR, p. 382-388 ; Donald J. raleigh, Experiencing Russia’s
Civil War: Politics, Society, and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov, 1917-1922, Princeton – Oxford, Princeton
University Press, 2002, p. 81. The slightly adapted regional classification is based on rossiia. Энциклопеди-
ческий словарь Брокгауз и Ефрон, rpt. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1991, p. 87-89.
74. GArf, f. r1235, op. 3, d. 13, l. 6 ; ibid., d. 15, l. 23; Poršneva, Крестьяне, рабочие…, p. 251.
75. Poršneva, Крестьяне, рабочие…, p. 237.
76. rGASPI, f. 274, op. 1, d. 5, l. 35; Häfner, PLSR, p. 380-389.
77. Poršneva, Крестьяне, рабочие…, p. 256.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































BreST-LITOVSK AS A DOUBLe CAeSUrA: 
THe COnCLUSIOn Of An InTernATIOnAL PeACe TreATy 
AnD THe UnLeASHInG Of A frATrICIDAL WAr
By the terms of the treaty, Soviet russia had to cede finland, estonia,
Courland, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine – an area of about 1.4 million square
kilometres. These territories became either independent or German protectorates.
Moreover, according to calculations Soviet russia lost 27 per cent of her
utilized agricultural areas with 37 per cent of the total average yield, 60 million
inhabitants totalling to about one third of her population, 73 per cent of her
iron ores and 75 per cent of her coal production.78 These parameters aggravated
an already severe economic crisis.79 The peace deprived russia not only of the
Ukrainian coal and ore but also of its grain-producing regions. The overall
breakdown of the railway system, the cutting off of european russia’s industries
from the badly needed deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs meant that
the country could not recover. Unemployment and shutdowns of enterprises
would keep going on and thus fuelling dearth, hunger and social unrest.80 What
is more, Brest-Litovsk was neither a just and democratic peace nor did the
treaty establish a breathing spell, both promised by Lenin.81 On the one hand,
it became a synonym for an inacceptable capitulation, for an undemocratic and
even “obscene” peace that contributed to a large extent to the waxing unpopu-
larity of the Bolsheviks in many regions82 of Soviet russia. On the other hand,
it symbolized the “political comeback” of the Mensheviks and Srs,83 as Vladimir
Brovkin has aptly put it already 25 years ago.
All important political parties in russia–the Srs, the SDs and even the lib-
eral Kadets–were split in the question of war and peace. no party remained
monolithic in the course of 1917 and early 1918. The Bolsheviks were no excep-
tion to the rule, where political infighting and severe dissent lead almost to a
split of the party in 1918. even staunch anti-war internationalists such as left
russian social democrats were upset about the bleak results of the Brest-Litovsk
78. Häfner, « Von „Sturmvögeln“ und „Don Quixoten“ : Vier Publikationen zu den Parteien des neona-
rodničestvo in revolution und Bürgerkrieg », Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 61, 2013, 1, p. 119-125,
here p. 122.
79. Scott B. Smith, Captives of Revolution : The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik Dictatorship,
1918-1923, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011, p. 36.
80. P. Andželič, « Мир », Знамя Труда. Крестьянская и Рабочая Газета. Орган Самарской органи-
зации партии левых социалистов-револиуционеров, no. 2, 21.3.1918, p. 1.
81. Aleksandr I. Jur′ev, Эсеры на историческом переломе (1917-1918), Moskva, Kučkovo pole, 2011,
p. 215.
82. rGASPI, f. 564, op. 1, d. 1, l. 108 ; Партия левых социалистов-революционеров : Документы и
материалы, t. 1: Июль 1917 г.-май 1918 г., (sost.) Jaroslav V. Leont′ev, Moskva, rOSSPÈn, 2000, p. 291 ;
The Socialist-Revolutionary Party After October 1917. Documents from the P.S.-R. Archives, selected by
Marc Jansen, Amsterdam, Stichting Beheer, 1989, p. 37, 57-63, 75-82.
83. Vladimir n. Brovkin, « The Mensheviks’ Political Comeback: The election of the Provincial City
Soviets in Spring 1918 », Russian Review 42, 1983, 1, p. 1-50.
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“peace” treaty.84 Many internationalists blamed the Sovnarkom’s collaboration
with the imperialist Quadruple Alliance for the fading prospects of World revo-
lution. This example shows that revolutionary defencists as well as outspoken
internationalists turned into critics of the peace.
Brest-Litovsk led to a realignment within russia’s political left-wing spec-
trum: It bridged to a certain extent the former existing watershed between de-
fencists and internationalists.85 The treaty did not yet lead to a polarized world
leaving Left Srs, Sr-Maximalists and Anarchists still in between. However,
the peace treaty contributed to fuel civil war. Bolshevik grain procurement
measures became ever more random and violent thus alienating the producers
as well as the Lefts Srs, who claimed to represent the peasantry’s political in-
terests.86 After the Left Sr’s so called “July uprising” of 1918 Soviet russia fi-
nally became a Bolshevik dictatorship.
However, to link all problems of the Bolsheviks to the Brest-Litovsk treaty
would be a monocausal explanation. There were other issues of political dis-
agreement such as the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the habit of the
Bolshevik party to equate their rule with Soviet power,87 the often violent, arbi-
trary or even illegal actions of the Cheka, Bolshevik or so called Soviet institu-
tions and organs with Bolshevik majorities.
The causal nexus of a foreign policy of appeasement towards the Central
powers, the tight supply situation, the shut downs of industrial plants because
of the Brest-Litovsk treaty and its related economic implications were obvious
to the Bolsheviks political opponents, especially the Left Srs. In their eyes,
Lenin’s breathing spell was no more than wishful thinking. They thought that
the termination of this ruinous policy would be a panacea to cure all contempo-
rary Soviet russian problems. The Bolsheviks regarded the critique of the dis-
senting parties as counterrevolutionary and used their propaganda as a pretext
for the decree of the All-russian Central executive Committee to oust Men-
sheviks and Sr from this institution and successively from Soviets all over the
country.88
The moderate socialists did not recognize that revolutions were character-
ized by an accelerated course of time: Instead of acting pragmatically, they
insisted on an allegedly objective historical development, as well as on neces-
sary positions of statesmanship [gosudarstvennost′]. Instead of seeking dialogue
with their potential proletarian and rural supporters, the moderate socialists took
84. A. Serafimovič, « На митинге. Впечатления », Петроградская Правда: Орган Центрального и
Петроградского Комитета Российской Коммунистической Партии (большевиков), no. 55, 21.3.1918,
p. 2.
85. Smith, Captives of Revolution…, p. 41.
86. Šubin, Старт Страны Советов…, p. 409.
87. Smith, Captives of Revolution…, p. 31.
88. Партия левых социалистов-революционеров : Документы и материалы, t. 2, ч. 1 : Апрель-июль
1918 г., sostavitel′, avtor predisloviia, vvedeniia i kommentariev Ja. V. Leont′ev, Moskva, rOSSPÈn, 2010,
p. 163, 171-172 ; Jur′ev, Эсеры на историческом…, p. 218-235; Häfner, « Von „Sturmvögeln“… », p. 123.
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intransigent positions with regard to central domestic problems. Urgent issues
on the political agenda such as the agrarian question or workers’ control and
participation in the management of the factories remained unresolved. And,
worst of all: The war dragged on. Probably the gravest shortcoming of revolu-
tionary defencism was that it could not offer any alternative but war to final
victory. There was no other way to stop the war. As no end to war was in sight,
the slogan “Keep it up!”, however, became less attractive and convincing with
every new day characterised by supply shortfalls, rising inflation and other socio-
economic problems. It was this desperateness about a senseless war that let ever
more people doubt of and despair about patriotism. In the end, the moderate
socialists fed all social groups with mere hopes of a brighter future. Political
short-sightedness combined with the ideologically motivated obstinacy of the
moderate socialists led to a fatal immobility. It resulted in a series of outcomes
that they had all sought to prevent. first, there was a profound loss of confidence
in a democratic parliamentary system which could have produced results com-
mensurate with the requirements of the rule of law. Secondly, political radicalism
accelerated and a despotic regime gained power that unleashed a frightening
Civil War. Third, russia was subject to an annexationist peace.
